If your customer is in China, Iran, Russia, or any other jurisdiction where the open internet is throttled or surveilled · fallonion gives them a .onion address that the regime can't easily block.
"The estate already rides on top of the internet. fallonion adds the layer below: Tor's hidden services. Same content, same Ed25519 signatures, but reachable via Tor Browser when nothing else is."
gh repo clone sjgant80-hub/fallonion
cd fallonion
bash setup.sh start # installs tor + writes hidden-service torrc
sudo tor -f /etc/tor/torrc.fallonion
bash setup.sh address # prints your .onion addressThen start a local server on port 8443 (e.g. via fallcdn with caddy mode) serving your estate. Your .onion address mirrors that content via Tor.
| Does | Doesn't |
|---|---|
| Gives you a .onion address for censored users | Anonymize you (the publisher) |
| Mirrors your clearnet content via Tor | Hide your laptop's IP from your ISP |
| Survives even when ISPs block the clearnet site | Replace fallmirror / fallcdn / fallnet |
| Pairs with fallshield for signed identity | Improve speed (Tor is slower) |
fallonion is the LAYER 4 of the defensive estate:
Most users hit Layer 1. The ones who need Layer 4 are the ones who need it most.
| Threat | fallonion response |
|---|---|
| Great Firewall of China blocks ai-nativesolutions.com | .onion still reachable via Tor Browser |
| Iran throttles or blocks Cloudflare | Tor exits routed through 8000+ relays in 90+ countries |
| Russia outlaws Western SaaS | Tor hidden service does not pass through Western SaaS |
| A journalist needs your sovereign tool but is being watched | .onion access leaves no DNS trail for their ISP |
9 defensive products. Every threat vector covered.
MIT · part of AI Native Solutions · source